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I.IN'TRODUCTION 
In the United States, the prosecution of organized crime raises 
serious procedural questions. Three matters, in particular, are 
worthy of consideration here. The first involves the application of 
constitutional principles regarding the search and seizure provision. 
The second is the newly refined and powerful prosecution tool of 
forfeiture of property. The third looks to the ability of the 
government to initiate long-term investigations and the later 
evaluation of the accused's defense of entrapment. 
This Article will explore these matters, looking to the 
constitutional, policy, and practical implications of a broadening 
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government attack on organized crime. I begin with an analysis of 
the search and seizure provision. 
II. APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
reads: 
The right of the people to be seqll-e in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.1 
This Amendment applies to both federal and state actions. 2 
However, the Fourth Amendment considers only the conduct of 
government agents such as police officers and private citizens acting 
on a request from the government. It does not apply to purely 
private acts: 
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful 
searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its 
protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and 
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon 
the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended 
to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; 
as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested 
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his 
property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly 
issued.3 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
3. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 
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As protection from unreasonable searches and seizures is a 
constitutional right, the government may face serious sanctions if 
its conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. Evidence obtained in 
violation of this Amendment is subject to the exclusionary rule in 
both federal4 and state courts.5 This rule provides that the 
government may not use evidence obtained illegally at trial. The 
principle, as established, is not found in the text of the 
Constitution. As noted in Wolf v. Colorado/ the doctrine of 
exclusion "was not derived from the explicit requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing 
Congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The 
decision was a matter of judicial implication. "7 It was for this reason 
that the United States Supreme Court initially limited the 
application of the exclusionary rule. However, in Mapp v. Ohio, the 
court held that the rule applied to the states as well as the federal 
government. 8 
The Court established that this principle of exclusion is 
necessary to deter police from improper behavior: "The rule ... 
operates as 'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard 
4. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
If letters and private documents can [unreasonably] be seized and held 
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the 
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure 
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those 
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the 
Constitution. 
!d. at 393. 
!d. 
5. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation 
of the Constitution is ••• inadmissible in a state court. Since the Fourth 
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the 
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is 
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used 
against the Federal Government. 
6. 338 u.s. 25 (1949). 
7. Id. at 28. 
8. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56. 
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Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, 
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.'"9 
In keeping with this purpose of the exclusionary rule, unless the 
state constitution provides otherwise, 10 there are recognized 
exceptions to the doctrine. While it cannot be used in the state's 
case in chief, the government evidence may offer the limited 
purpose of impeaching the defendant's in-court testimony.11 Also, 
the Supreme Court has held that the deterrent function of the rule 
is ineffective in situations in which the police acted in good faith in 
executing a warrant which later turns out to be defective.12 In some 
situations, then, such resulting evidence is admissible. There are 
several situations, however, where the police are not granted the 
benefit of this good faith exception to exclusion. 
We do not suggest, however, that exclusion is always 
inappropriate in cases where an officer has obtained a 
warrant and abided by its terms .... [T]he officer's reliance 
on the magistrate's probable-cause determination and on the 
technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be 
objectively reasonable, and it is clear that in some 
circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds 
for believing that the warrant was properly issued. 
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if 
the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by 
information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or 
would have known was false except for his reckless 
disregard of the truth. The exception [for good faith reliance 
on a defective warrant] will also not apply in cases where 
the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role ... 
9. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (citing United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974)). See generally William}. Stuntz, 7be Virtues 
and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443 (1997). 
10. Some states do require exclusion as a matter of state constitutional law. 
See, e.g., Vermont v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991). 
11. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). 
12. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-09. 
1998] PROSECUTING ORGANIZED CRIME 1383 
[because] in such circumstances, no reasonably well-trained 
officer should rely on the warrant. Nor would an officer 
manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based 
on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." 
Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular 
case, a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e., in failing to 
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be 
seized-that the executing officers cannot reasonably 
presume it to be valid.13 
The evidence gathered directly from the illegal search or seizure 
must be suppressed. However, the use of other evidence acquired 
either directly or indirectly from the illegally-obtained materials 
may also be restricted.14 This principle is referred to as th'e "tainted 
13. Id. at 922-23 (citations omitted). 
14. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 {1939) ("To forbid the 
direct use of methods thus characterized but to put no curb on their full indirect 
use would only invite the very methods deemed •inconsistent with ethical 
standards and destructive of personal liberty.'"); see also Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees of 
sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, this Court held 
nearly half a century ago that evidence seized during an unlawful search 
could not constitute proof against the victim of the search. The 
exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct 
products of such invasions. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court 
in [the Silverthorne] case, in holding that the Government might not 
make use of information obtained during an unlawful search to 
subpoena from the victims the very documents illegally viewed, 
expressed succinctly the policy of the broad exclusionary rule: 
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a 
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used 
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does 
not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. 
If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may 
be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the 
Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed." 
Id. at 484-85 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 
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fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. So, in a situation where the 
illegal search of a home leads the police to find a gun in the home 
and a knife hidden in a car, both items would be excluded. The 
evidence of the knife would be admissible, the "taint" would be 
attenuated, if the government can demonstrate that the police 
would have discovered the knife regardless of the illegal action, 15 
the police obtained this evidence from an independent source not 
connected to the illegal search or seizure, 16 or there is too weak or 
too distant a connection between the illegal police search or seizure 
and the challenged evidenceP Moreover, a defendant's intervening 
act of his own free will can also break the chain between the 
evidence and the illegal search or seizure allowing the admission of 
the evidence.18 
The key to applying the Fourth Amendment doctrine is the 
definition of the appropriate terms, for if the police have not, in the 
constitutional sense, "searched or seized" the individual, a defendant 
cannot successfully assert a Fourth Amendment claim. Early case 
law narrowly applied the exclusionary rule, refusing to label a 
government action as a search or seizure unless the government 
physically trespassed on the defendant's property, or specifically 
searched the defendant's house, person, papers, or effects, as 
enumerated in the text of the Fourth Amendment. 
Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court took a drastically different 
approach to defining search and seizure. In Katz v. United States, 19 
the government used electronic surveillance without a warrant to 
monitor a call made by the defendant from a public phone booth.20 
In its decision, the Court turned from the traditional property 
analysis to a new privacy consideration, _determining that the 
392 (1920)). 
15. This is referred to as "inevitable discovery." See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431, 441-42 (1984). 
16. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 475-77 (1980). 
17. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990). 
18. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-86. 
19. 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
20. See id at 348. 
1998] PROSECUTING ORGANIZED CRIME 1385 
Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places.21 However, 
this privacy approach required some action by the defendant: in 
order to invoke the privacy rights associated with the Fourth 
Amendment, the defendant must take steps to shield her privacy. 
What one freely offers to the public, even in one's own home, will 
not be protected by the Fourth Amendment, for no privacy 
concern would have been expressed by the accused.22 
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in 
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected. 23 
The Supreme Court has defined some of the privacy situations 
which are particularly significant in combating organized crime. 
Defendants do not have a recognizable interest generally as to the 
government's use of an officer's normal senses and commonly-used 
or generally-available enhancements, such as flashlights. For 
instance, the Court has categorized helicopters as commonly-
available technology, despite its mechanical sophistication, thus 
stating that defendants normally have no privacy interest from 
overhead observation. 24 Drug-sniffing dogs have also been approved 
under the Fourth Amendment because of the limited intrusion and 
because a defendant has no privacy expectations in contraband 
being transported in a public place.25 
Electronic surveillance is of special importance in this area. The 
Supreme Court decisions construing the Fourth Amendment have 
evolved markedly since the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States.26 
21. See id. at 351. 
22. See id. 
23. Id. 
24. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 {1989). 
25. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 646, 707 {1983). 
26. 277 u.s. 438 {1928). 
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There, in the first wiretap case to reach the Supreme Court, the 
majority concluded that police wiretaps did not constitute a search 
and seizure.27 This decision emphasized that there was no physical 
trespass onto the defendant's property and that conversations are 
intangible and cannot be seized. Congress reacted to the issue of 
wiretapping in the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Section 
605 of that Act read: "[N]o person not being authorized by the 
sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or 
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or 
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. "28 In 
line with Congress' intent in enacting the Federal Communications 
Act, the decision in Katz expressly rejected Olmstead and its 
progeny, holding that any form of electronic surveillance, be it 
wiretapping or electronic surveillance, that violates a reasonable 
expectation of privacy constitutes a search and/ or seizure and is 
subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.29 
[A]lthough a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead 
that surveillance without any trespass and without seizure 
of any material object fell outside the ambit of the 
Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view 
on which that decision rested ... : 
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and 
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions 
that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer 
be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's 
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied 
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.30 
27. See id at 441. 
28. 47 u.s.c. § 605 (1939). 
29. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
30.Id 
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The Supreme Court has defined the constitutional requirements 
in cases of electronic surveillance. Berger v. New Yorfe31 established 
the minimum standards for a valid warrant authorizing electronic 
surveillance: (1) the warrant must describe with particularity the 
conversations to be overheard; (2) a showing of probable cause to 
believe that a specific crime has been or is being committed must be 
made; (3) the wiretapping must be for a limited period of time; ( 4) 
the suspects whose conversations are to be overheard must be 
named; (5) a return must be made to the court, showing what 
conversations were intercepted; (6) and the wiretapping must 
terminate when the desired information has been obtained.32 In 
addition, a neutral, disinterested magistrate must determine 
whether a warrant should be issued for electronic surveillance.33 
Congress has since enacted more stringent requirements for the 
use of electronic surveillance without the consent of a party. Title 
ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196834 
authorizes the United States Attorney General, or certain other 
officials, to allow an investigating agency to submit an application 
to a judge for an order permitting interception of wire or oral 
communications. The application may only be authorized where 
such interception may provi~e evidence of certain enumerated 
federal crimes, including murder, robbery, extortion, bribery and 
drug dealing. Upon receiving an application, the judge may grant 
an interception order only if there is compliance with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518 in that: 
a. there is probable cause for belief that an individual is 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a 
particular offense enumerated in§ 2516 of this chapter; 
31. 388 u.s. 41 (1967). 
32. See id. at 55-60. 
33. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 
(1972). 
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994). See generally United States v. Denman, 
100 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 450 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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b. there is probable cause for belief that particular 
communications concerning that offense will be 
obtained through such interception; 
c. normal investigative procedures have been tried and 
have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to 
succeed if tried or be too dangerous; 
d. . .. there is probable cause for belief that the facilities 
from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or 
electric communications are to be intercepted are being 
used, or are about to be used, in connection with the 
commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed in 
the name of, or commonly used by such person.35 
An order granted under this title must give: 
a. the identity of the person, if known, whose 
communications are to be intercepted; 
b. the nature and location of the communications facilities 
as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept 
is granted; 
c. a particular description of the type of communication 
sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the 
particular offense to which it relates; 
d. the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the 
communications, and of the person authorizing the 
application; and 
e. the period of time during which such interception is 
authorized, including a statement as to whether or not 
the interception shall automatically terminate when the 
described communication has been first obtained.36 
One important law enforcement tactic in fighting organized 
crime in which the Fourth Amendment generally does not apply is 
35. 18 u.s.c. § 2518(3). 
36. !d.§ 2518(4). 
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with information freely given to undercover government agents. 
Indeed, the Court has narrowly limited the constitutional reach 
here, even in situations in which the agent electronically .records the 
defendant's conversation. The key is that the accused voluntarily 
spoke to the agent. The Court in United State v. Wbitil7 held that 
one may not have a justifiable expectation that his trusted associates 
neither are nor will become police agents, and that a different result 
is not needed when the agent has recorded or transmitted the 
conversations between the parties.38 Essentially, the defendant 
assumes the risk that the ·person with whom he is conversing is an 
informant for the government. 
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize 
and risk that his companions may be reporting to the 
police. If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the 
ass9ciation will very probably end or never materialize. But 
if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he 
has, the risk is his. In terms of what his course will be, what 
he will or will not do or say, we are unpersuaded that he 
would distinguish between probable informers on the one 
hand and probable informers with transmitters on the 
other .... 
Nor should we be too ready to erect constitutional barriers 
to relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate 
and reliable. An electronic recording will many times 
produce a more reliable rendition of what a defendant has 
said than will the unaided memory of a police agent. It may 
also be that with the recording in existence it is less likely 
that the informant will change his mind, less chance that 
threat or injury will suppress unfavorable evidence cuJ.d less 
chance that cross-examination will confound the 
testimony.39 
37. 401 u.s. 745 (1971). 
38. See id. at 752. 
39. Id. at 752-53. 
1390 THEW A YNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1379 
Some have asserted that "[a] coherent interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment would treat government informants the same 
way the Court treats governmental wiretapping."40 While these 
critics would mandate the usual "constitutional requirements of 
probable cause, [and a warrant], "41 the courts have not been 
convinced. 42 Indeed, the principal constitutional restriction 
involving undercover agents is not the Fourth Amendment, rather 
it is the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court has carefully 
applied the right to counsel to situations in which the undercover 
agent questions the formally charged defendant.43 The exclusion of 
the defendant's comments would apply even if the defendant is not 
in police custody.44 
ill. FORFEITURE45 
One effective tool against organized crime has been the 
forfeiture procedure. Property used in the commission of a crime 
may be subject to state or federal seizure, without compensation, 
even when the property was obtained lawfully. 
40. Tracey Machlin, Informants and the Fourth Amendment: A 
Reconsideration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 573, 628 (1996); see also Commonwealth v. 
Schaeffer, 688 A.2d 1143 {Pa. 1993) (interpreting a state constitution). 
41. Machlin, supra note 40, at 575. 
42. See id. at 634. "A home or private conversation should not lose its 
constitutional protection against promiscuous police intrusion merely because 
an individual has allowed a third party's presence. When it comes to Fourth 
Amendment rights, the difference between the police and everyone else matters." 
Id. at 634-35. 
43. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964). 
44. See id at 205. 
45. The Author notes in the summer of 1998, the United States Supreme 
Court decided United States v. Bajakajian. 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998). In this case the 
Court, for the first time, struck down a forfeiture as being "grossly 
disproportional" to the crime. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Thomas for the majority 
emphasized that the "amount of the forfeiture [did not] bear some relationship 
to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish." Id. at 2036. As such, 
the penalty in the case was deemed to violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment. See id. at 2038. 
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Two separate kinds of forfeiture exist in the United States. 
Criminal forfeiture is a seizure that results from a criminal 
conviction under a statute that requires the relinquishing of specific 
property, such as vehicles used in drug transactions. Civil forfeiture 
is not dependent on the defendant's conviction of a crime. Though 
civil forfeiture proceedings may sometimes follow a criminal trial, 
the civil forfeiture action is a separate and independent process 
brought by the govemment.46 The standard of proof in civil 
forfeiture proceedings is much less than that required by a criminal 
trial; usually the government need only prove the defendant's guilt 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 47 
One of the primary difficulties in applying forfeiture statutes 
concerns jointly held property. The government must protect 
innocent persons. Forfeiture of jointly owned property may injure 
an innocent person who was not responsible for, and not 
knowledgeable of, the defendant's wrongdoing. Eliminating the 
remedy of forfeiture in such a setting may, however, discourage law 
enforcement initiatives and may also encourage criminals to place 
property with other individuals. 
The Supreme Court explored -this tension between the 
protection of innocent persons and the imposition of forfeiture 
proceedings in Bennis v. Michigan.48 In Beanis, the husband used the 
family automobile, of which his wife was a joint owner, to engage 
in unlawful sexual activities with a prostitute. State law required the 
forfeiture of property used in such criminal activities; the state took 
ownership of the car despite the wife's interest in it. She protested, 
asserting that her substantial interest in the property had been taken 
even though she did nothing wrong and had no knowledge of 
wrongdoing.49 The Supreme Court rejected this "innocent owner 
defense" a..."'l.d upheld the state forfeiture law: 
[Petitioner] claims she was entitled to contest the abatement 
46. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994). 
47. See id. 
48. 516 u.s. 442 (1996). 
49. See id. at 446. 
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by showing she did not know her husband would use it to 
violate Michigan's indecency law. But a long and unbroken 
line of cases holds that an owner's interest in property may 
be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is 
put even though the owner did not know that it was to be 
put to such use .... 
She did not know that her car would be used in an illegal 
activity that would subject it to forfeiture. But ... the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
protect her interest against forfeiture by the government. 50 
Another major issue concerning forfeiture statutes is the 
question of whether such actions violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the United States Constitution if they are utilized after a 
criminal conviction.51 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment reads: "nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. "52 In United 
States v. Ursery, 53 the defendant was convicted of various criminal 
charges. The government then filed a civil action for forfeiture 
against the same defendant for the same criminal acts.54 The 
Supreme Court allowed the forfeiture proceeding because "these in 
rem civil forfeitures are neither 'punishment' nor criminal for 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause."55 The Court strongly 
supported the property forfeiture remedy stating: 
Since the earliest years of this Nation, Congress has 
authorized the Government to seek parallel in rem civil 
forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions based upon the 
50. I d. at 446, 449. 
51. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,629 (1993) raised the constitutional 
concern in its conclusion that a civil judgment may serve, in part, to "punish" 
the owner of forfeited property. 
52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
53. 518 u.s. 267 (1996). 
54. See id. 
55. Id. at 292. 
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same underlying events. And, in a long line of cases, this 
Court has considered the application of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeitures, consistendy concluding 
that the Clause does not apply to such actions because they 
do not impose punishment .... 
"[U]nless the forfeiture sanction was intended as 
punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal in 
character, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable. 
The question, then, is whether a § 924(d) forfeiture 
proceeding is intended to be, or by its nature necessarily is, 
criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial." 
Our inquiry proceeded in two stages. In the first stage, we 
looked to Congress' intent, and concluded that "Congress 
designed forfeiture under § 924(d) as a remedial civil 
sanction .... In the second stage of our analysis, we looked 
to "'whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in 
purpose or effect as to negate' Congress' intention to 
establish a civil remedial mechanism." 
Our cases reviewing civil forfeitures under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause adhere to a remarkably consistent theme. 
Though the two-part analytical construct employed ... was 
more refined, perhaps, than that we had used over 50 years 
earlier •.. , the conclusion was the same in each case: in rem 
civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from 
potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, 
and does not constitute a punishment under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 56 
IV. UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AND THE ENTRAPMENT 
DEFENSE 
Law enforcement officials often find it essential, in investigating 
56. Id. at 274, 277-78 (citations omitted). Of course, other narrower 
procedural issues are also present. See, e.g., United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120 
(5th Cir. 1997) (concerning assets legitimately and illegitimately obtained); Bye 
v. United States, 105 F.3d 856 (2d Cir. 1997) (concerning notice requirements). 
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organized crime, to engage in long term undercover investigations 
or "sting operations." In such situations, however, an entrapment 
defense is often raised. 57 All United States jurisdictions now provide 
for the defense of entrapment. The basic purpose behind 
recognizing entrapment is to prevent the government from 
manufacturing crime.58 American judges have struggled in 
attempting to define the distinction between improper government 
inducement and appropriate investigative tools. For example, it is 
not entrapment for a police officer simply to offer to purchase 
narcotics at the going price from someone believed to be a drug 
dealer. However, it may be entrapment for a police officer to 
persuade a suspect to sell narcotics by pretending to be the suspect's 
friend and applying immense pressure in playing on the sympathies 
of the suspect. 59 The United States Supreme Court has set forth the 
basic principles governing the defense of entrapment: 
[T]here can be no dispute that the Government may use 
undercover agents to enforce the law. "It is well settled that 
the fact that officers or employees of the Government 
merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission 
of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and 
stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in 
criminal enterprises." 
In their zeal to enforce the law, however, Government 
agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an 
innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a 
criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so 
that the Government may prosecute. Where the 
Government has induced an individual to break the law and 
the defense of entrapment is at issue . . . the prosecution 
must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
57. See generally Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the [Almost] Dead, the 
Entrapment Defense, 47 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1996). 
58. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434 (1963). See generally United 
States v. Cecil, 96 F.3d 1344, 1347-49 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
59. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
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disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being 
approached by Government agents. 60 
In Sorrells v. United States, 61 the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant cannot assert the entrapment defense if all the defendant 
shows is that the government provided the opportunity to commit 
a crime. 62 It also found, though, that the government's action may 
not "implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to 
commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that 
they may prosecute. "63 This difference was based on the Court's 
view concerning the purpose of legislators in enacting criminal 
statutes. The Court reasoned that the statute was being abused by 
the government.64 These statutes were not made part of the law so 
that the government could induce an otherwise innocent person to 
commit a crime just so that person could be punished. By looking 
to the "innocent" state of mind of the accused, the Justices 
established a subjective approach to the defense. 65 
The dissenting Justices in Sorrells reached a very different result 
as to entrapment. They enunciated the reasoning behind the 
objective test for entrapment. The minority discussed the public 
policy justifications for entrapment and concluded that the question 
of entrapment properly belongs to the judge, rather than the jury, 
and that the principal question would be to ask if the government 
acted responsibly in its investigations: 
The applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the 
trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents. 
No other issue, no comparison of equities as between the 
guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any place in the 
60. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 {1992) (quoting Sorrells 
v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)) (citations omitted). 
61. 287 u.s. 435 (1932) 
62. See id at 442. 
63.Id 
64. See id at 443-44. 
65. Seeid 
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enforcement of this overruling principle of public policy.66 
Although all states have an entrapment defense, they vary 
considerably its definition and application. Because the entrapment 
defense is not constitutionally based, states may use any test desired, 
and apply the defense as they decide. In most states, entrapment 
will be seen as a factual matter, to be resolved generally by the jury. 
In other states, especially those applying the objective test, it is seen 
as a question of law for the trial judge. Moreover, in some states if 
the defendant denies participation in the crime, the defense of 
entrapment is waived. In other states, and in the federal system, the 
defendant may raise the defense of entrapment, even while denying 
participation in the offense. In Mathews v. United States, 67 the 
Supreme Court allowed the defense of entrapment to be considered 
even if the defendant denied meeting the elements of the charged 
crime.68 
The difference in entrapment laws between the states and the 
federal system is largely due to the varying purposes behind 
entrapment. States that see entrapment as a curb on law 
enforcement use an objective standard where only the actions of the 
law enforcement are important. Other jurisdictions are primarily 
concerned with the mental state of the individual. These states look 
to see if the defendant is an innocent person coerced or persuaded 
into committing the crime. In these jurisdictions, the test for 
entrapment is subjective. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
reaffirmed the subjective test in federal entrapment cases. 69 
With the subjective test as used by the federal courts, the trier 
of fact must determine the state of mind of the defendant at a 
particular time.7° The issue of timing can become critical, for many 
66. !d. at 459 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
67. 485 u.s. 58 (1987}. 
68. See id at 63. 
69. See id. at 66-67 (Brennan, J., concurring), where the final dissenter on the 
topic, Justice Brennan, conceded the lack of controversy over the application of 
the subjective test for entrapment. 
70. See United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1062 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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investigations can last for weeks, months, or even years. The 
question then becomes whether the jury or judge is to look to the 
state of mind of the defendant at the moment of solicitation, during 
the period of solicitation) or before the soljcitation began. 
The United States Supreme Court answered this question in 
jacobson v. United States.71 The Court found that the government 
must show that the defendant was tr:uly predisposed to commit the 
crime and that a mere "inclination" to engage in activity is not 
enough.72 The defendant there was targeted by the government for 
twenty-six months through repeated mailings asking about his 
interest in child pornography, mailings that claimed to be from 
organizations that were in favor of allowing people to view child 
pomography.73 At the end of this extended period the agents asked 
the defendant to order child pornography and he responded 
immediately/4 A search of the defendant's home found magazines 
that featured child pornography, but the defendant had purchased 
these magazines before they became illegal to receive them through 
the maiF5 The Court held that the prosecution only showed a 
predisposition to view child pornography, not a predisposition to 
commit an illegal act.76 In deciding the appropriate time period for 
consideration, the Court looked not simply at the moment when 
the defendant was actually solicited by the government agents. 
Instead, it indicated that courts should focus on the entire period of 
government involvement.77 With that twenty-six month period in 
mind, the Court found entrapment as a matter of law and dismissed 
the criminal changes against the defendant.78 
The jacobson opinion has been highly influential throughout the 
United States. Several courts have construed it broadly in terms of 
71. 503 u.s. 540 (1992). 
72. See id. at 549. 
73. See id at 543-47. 
74. See id at 547. 
75. Seeid 
76. See id at 551. 
77. See id. at 553. 
78. See id at 554. 
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requiring a careful scrutiny of both the defendant's state of mind 
and the intensity of the government's involvement in the criminal 
enterprise. One federal court stated the matter plainly: 
The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous 
training or experience or occupation or acquaintances that 
it is likely that if the government had not induced him to 
commit the crime some criminal would have done so; only 
then does a sting or other arranged crime take a dangerous 
person out of circulation/9 
Even after jacobson, it is clear that judges mUst look at the extent of 
the government involvement in inducing the defendant to commit 
the crime. Later lower federal cases and many state courts still use 
a subjective test for entrapment. In essence, the question has now 
become: Would this sort of crime have occurred without the 
persuasion of the government agent? If the answer is no, i.he courts 
can find that the governmental involvement was too great, the 
predisposition of the defendant too weak, and the entrapment 
defense can be proved, perhaps even as a matter of law. 
In states which follow the objective test it is the actions of the 
government which are essential. The conduct of the accused is not 
normally a relevant issue. Instead, the question is whether the 
actions of the government were sufficient to induce an average, law-
abiding person to commit a crime. Under this inquiry, it should 
not matter whether this particular defendant was disposed to 
commit the crime. Examples of improper inducement under the 
objective standard are physical threats, sexual favors, appeals to 
sympathy and friendship, and the possibility of exorbitant gain. 80 
One of the leading entrapment cases under the objective view is the 
California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Barraza.81 The 
79. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994) (en 
bane); see Marcus, supra note 57. But see United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 
1394 (9th Cir. 1997). 
80. See People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 955 (Cal. 1979). 
81. Id. 
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court presumed that a normally law-abiding person would "resist 
the temptation to commit a crime presented by the single 
opportunity to act unlawfully. "82 It found that "if the actions of the 
law enforcement agent would generate in a normally law-abiding 
person a motive for the crime other than ordinary criminal intent, 
entrapment will be established. "83 Also, if affirmative police 
conduct would make commission of the crime especially attractive 
to a normally law-abiding person, that will also constitute 
entrapment. 84 
While the two approaches-subjective and objective-may 
appear mutually exclusive, some states have combined the tests 
either by judicial determination, or by a blend of state 
constitutional principles and statutory enactments. 85 In these states, 
the court determines if the defendant is predisposed to commit the 
crime. If the defendant is not predisposed, then entrapment 
occurred. If the defendant possessed that state of mind, the court 
will consider the government's conduct to decide if a law abiding 
person might have been induced under the circumstances by the 
extreme governmental action. 86 
The preference for one test or another, as previously stated, 
depends on the goals for the entrapment defense. When the state 
wants to make sure only the guilty-minded are punished, it will 
apply the subjective test. If the state wishes to use the defense to 
limit questionable police conduct, it will apply the objective test. 
The advantage to the subjective test is that it only ~eeks to punish 
those who are culpable. The disadvantage is that entrapment must 
be decided on a case-by-case basis. This type of determination is 
time-consuming and has little precedential value, as each case will 
have a different defendant and a unique fact pattern. The advantage 
82. Id. at 955. 
83./d. 
84. Seeid. 
85. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (West 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 626:5 (1996). 
86. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12(a)(1)-(2) (West 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 626:5 (1996). 
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of the objective test is that cases have more precedential impact 
because the review is of the police conduct. The disadvantage is that 
a guilty person may not be subject to criminal liability. 
While numerous procedural and evidentiary issues concerning 
the entrapment defense can be found, 87 the major debate over the 
defense has been which test to apply and how much government 
inducement will be allowed before it is found to constitute 
improper activity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Legislators and judges in the United States have given law 
enforcement officers considerable weapons in the fight against 
organized crime. In this article, I have discussed three of the most 
important: the allowance of broadened application of the search 
and seizure provisions of the federal Constitution, the use of 
forfeiture procedures, and the ability to engage in long term 
undercover investigations and "sting" operations. 
While each of the three certainly provides strong support to law 
enforcement, each creates serious questions of law and policy. The 
Fourth Amendment concerns are deeply felt and will continue to 
be raised in cases involving arguable invasions of privacy. Forfeiture 
which impacts on the assets of innocent individuals will give rise to 
proposals to limit sharply the reach of property seizure rules. 
Finally, the entrapment defense can be expected to be asserted, and 
applied, ever more vigorously as we see continued long term, 
intensive investigations of criminal activities. 
87. For instance, these issues concern the nature of the evidence allowed to 
show predisposition, actions of private individuals working on behalf of the 
government, and so on. See Marcus, supra note 57. 
